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I. INTRODUCTION
Access to higher education is on the road to becoming a public crisis as
it increasingly becomes unaffordable.' Public investment in higher education
is properly justified by the numerous public benefits associated with
education, ranging from increases in income, tax revenues, innovation, and
economic growth, and decreases in unemployment and dependence on
public services.2 These public benefits are not solely economic because
education fosters civic virtues and ethics that benefit the public at large.3 For
the public to receive these benefits, however, a significant component of the
public's investment must be directed towards making higher education
financially accessible for students who may not be able to afford what are
generally high costs and who might also be risk averse in regards to their
potential to earn enough future income that would make such an investment
economically wise.4
While some public educational investment, such as public funding of
universities, provides benefits to all potential students regardless of their
economic circumstances, other forms of public investment, such as need-
based loans and income-based repayment, are designed to make higher
1. See Adam Davidson, Is College Tuition Really Too High?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/13/magazine/is-college-tuition-too-high.html
(noting that tuition at private colleges and universities is three times more expensive while
public college and university tuition has increased by nearly four times since 1974, and, as a
result, "[fjor the average American household that doesn't receive a lot of financial aid, higher
education is simply out of reach").
2. See id.; see also Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 527, 532-48 (2013) ("[A] large proportion of the benefits of human capital redound to
public finances rather than to the educated worker.").
3. Simkovic, supra note 2, at 551 (noting that non-economic benefits "range from
promoting equality or social mobility, to safeguarding liberty, to reinforcing moral and ethical
behavior, to fostering informed participation in democratic processes, to encouraging
voluntarism and civic virtue").
4. John R. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financing of Higher
Education, 104 GEO. L.J. 229, 264 (2015) [hereinafter Income-Driven Repayment] (noting
that, while numerous non-economic cultural factors might discourage students from seeking
out post-secondary education, economic barriers related to high costs that must be incurred
before the student knows what his or her economic return on the educational investment will
remain a significant barrier).
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education more accessible and affordable by directing relief to those who
need it while preventing windfalls from going to those who do not.5 These
measures are becoming increasingly important in making higher education
affordable, given decreasing levels of public support for universities.6
Currently, these need- and income-based measures take the form of need-
based grants, which direct subsidies to students with low parental income or
wealth at the time they enroll in an educational program, or income-based
repayment programs, which direct subsidies to borrowers based on their
post-graduate income.7 These need- and income-based programs work in
tandem because neither program by itself can allocate relief correctly to
those who need it.' Because need-based grants focus on a financial snapshot
of the student at the moment the grant is received, it is easier for these grants
to account for the relevant facts at that moment to minimize any potential
distortions that might occur from misallocating grant funds to those who
would not need the benefit-at least from the perspective of their financial
need at the time the funds are received.9 The income-based repayment
programs currently in place, however, provide greater opportunities for
misallocation of benefits and economic distortions because these programs
do not consider all of the relevant variables that establish a borrower's true
ability to repay the loan.
It is understandable that the current structure of income-based
repayment programs produces distortions. When Congress enacts a debt
relief provision in response to a perceived crisis in the economy, it paints
with a broad brush to provide what it considers to be an immediate fix
without considering the potential distortions that its relief efforts might
cause and the opportunities for taxpayers to undermine the intended relief by
gaming the system through planning.'0 Current income-based repayment
5. Id. at 264-67.
6. Davidson, supra note 1.
7. Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 4, at 264.
8. Id. at 264-67 (noting that need-based grants potentially provide relief to those who
do not otherwise need it because they end up earning high incomes, while income-based
repayment programs solve this problem but face misallocation concerns of their own in that
borrowers might choose less economically productive pursuits because of the subsidy).
9. See id. (noting that need-based grants are distributed according to the single factor
of parental income at the time of the grant, while income-based grants may distort proper
allocation due to the uncertainty of the recipient's ability and inclination to earn a high income
and repay the loan).
10. Bradford P. Anderson, Robbing Peter to Pay for Paul's Residential Real Estate
Speculation: The Injustice of Not Taxing Forgiven Mortgage Debt, 36 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
1, 6-7 (2011) (noting that similar results were seen in Congress's efforts to respond to the last
collapse in the real estate market by exempting from taxation forgiven mortgage debt, which,
while helping some taxpayers in need, also created planning opportunities for others to take
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programs put in place as a response to increasing levels of student debt
exemplify this tendency and produce the following distortions and
unanticipated inequitable outcomes: (1) institutions of higher education are
insulated from market pressure; (2) taxation of debt forgiveness outside of
the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program provides a preference
for government and nonprofit work over private sector employment that is
not necessarily justifiable; (3) certain married couples are disadvantaged by
being forced to file as married filing separately, which causes them to forgo
valuable tax benefits; and (4) the debt forgiveness aspects of these programs
allow borrowers to plan for the possible tax consequences far enough in
advance to potentially allow them to obtain free funding from the
government in excess of what they need for educational purposes without
having to repay it." These distortions could be minimized by restructuring
these income-based programs to tie relief to a borrower's overall ability to
pay, rather than tying it to his or her income.
Although the student repayment programs were not instituted through
the Internal Revenue Code, they have nevertheless become intertwined with
tax law, given that repayment is a function of the borrower's adjusted gross
income and the creation of a potential tax liability through debt forgiveness.
As a result, these repayment programs have assumed the characteristics of
both an income tax and a loan.12 Because loans are established liabilities, a
superior analytical approach to harmonize the quasi-tax and quasi-loan
characteristics would be to structure student loan repayment similarly to that
of established tax liabilities. Tax collection and enforcement procedures
provide a useful model for how to structure repayment based on the ability-
to-pay principles that typically arise in the context of paying established tax
liabilities.
Specifically, the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Offer in Compromise
(OIC) procedure'3 provides a potential framework that could be applied in
the student loan repayment context. A student loan repayment program
modeled on the OIC procedure provides a more nuanced system of
advantage of the tax exemption despite a lack of severe economic need). But see Dustin A.
Zacks, Avoiding Insult to Injury: Extending and Expanding Cancellation of Indebtedness
Income Tax Exemptions for Homeowners, 66 ARK. L. REV. 317,325 (2013) (arguing that while
some opportunistic behavior might have resulted from exempting certain mortgage debt
forgiveness from taxation, the benefits received by homeowners who were victims of a flawed
system of mortgage lending considerably outweigh these costs).
11. For a complete discussion of how these distortions arise, see infra Part III.
12. John R. Brooks, Student Loans as Taxes, 151 TAx NOTES 513, 515 (2016)
[hereinafter Student Loans as Taxes]; Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 4, at 230-31.
13. See generally IRM 5.8.1 (May 5, 2017) (providing an overview of the OIC
procedure).
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repayment than the current income-based system and would be better suited
to provide relief to those who need it the most by tying repayment to a host
of economic factors that go to the heart of a borrower's ability to repay a
loan rather than tying repayment solely to a borrower's income.14 These
factors can include both past and future income as well as information about
a taxpayer's expenses and family size.'5
More specifically, the OIC procedure can be an appropriate model for
determining ability to pay because it provides an example of a standardized
repayment procedure that is designed to look beyond income as the only
indicator of a taxpayer's ability to pay and to focus on the taxpayer's entire
financial picture. When evaluating an QIC, the IRS considers the taxpayer's
income, necessary expenses, assets, and liabilities. 16 In addition, the IRS
considers the taxpayer's potential to improve his or her financial situation in
the future, which can influence the amount of the offer the IRS is willing to
accept.'7 The goal of the program is to provide relief to taxpayers who
legitimately need it while avoiding giving a windfall to taxpayers who are
capable of paying their liability during the period of the collection statute of
limitations, after which the debt is effectively cancelled because the IRS
becomes barred from taking collection actions." The OIC program's goals
are strikingly similar to the goals underlying the student loan repayment
programs, but the OIC program accomplishes these goals in a way that
produces fewer distortions than the current student loan repayment
programs.'9
While an argument certainly can be made that student loan repayment
programs should have no connection to any aspect of the tax laws, it may be
difficult to disentangle these areas of law fully, given the federalization of
almost all student lending. Accordingly, if there is going to be a connection
between these two areas of law, the laws surrounding the collection of taxes
may provide a mechanism by which these two areas of law can be better
14. Kiran Sheffrin, Trapped by Forgiveness: Taxing COD Income, 144 TAX NOTES
1191, 1195 (2014).
15. Id.
16. See generally IRM 5.8.5 (Sept. 23, 2008).
17. IRM 5.8.5.21 (Sept. 30, 2013); IRM 5.8.6.1 (Oct. 29, 2010 & July 31, 2014).
18. I.R.C. § 6502 (2012) (designating the general statute of limitations, often referred to
as the "collection statute expiration date" or "CSED" for collection actions brought by the IRS
as ten years).
19. Compare IRM 5.8.5.21 (Sept. 30, 2013) (recognizing that future incomes are often
uncertain, and that securing a collateral agreement based on a likely future increase in income
is in the government's best interest when seeking to collect a debt), with Income-Driven
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harmonized by targeting relief to those who need it while minimizing
unintended distortions.
This Article examines how the OIC procedure can be applied to provide
more tailored and appropriately targeted debt relief than current income-
based student loan repayment programs. Part II provides a brief overview of
the current income-based repayment programs and summarizes the
arguments demonstrating that these effectively function as a tax. Part III
examines the economic distortions caused by current income-based
repayment programs in detail. And Parts IV and V illustrate how the OIC
procedures can be used as a model to create a Student Loan Compromise
Program that minimizes distortions and provides more appropriate relief to
those who need it.
II. A TAX INCREASE FOR STUDENT BORROWERS: CURRENT STUDENT LOAN
REPAYMENT PROGRAMS
While student loan repayment programs tied to income are not a new
concept, recent growth in these programs, combined with the increasing cost
of higher education and direct federalization of most student loans, has made
use of these programs much more widespread.20 The expansion in these
programs has resulted in the federal government creating several different
income-based repayment possibilities for federal loans, the most commonly
used of which can be summarized as follows:21
20. Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt,
55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329, 334-35 (2013) (describing the rapid increase in higher
education costs and student borrowing since 1990 and observing that, since 1983, the cost of
college education has risen by three times the rate of inflation, making higher education in the
United States more xpensive than in most places in the world); Student Loans as Taxes, supra
note 12, at 513-14 (noting that income-based student loan repayment programs date back to
1993 when Income Contingent Repayment was established, but that the programs were
expanded and made significantly more generous in 2007 and 2010, coinciding with the federal
government effectively taking over the majority of student lending by ending the federally
subsidized Federal Family Educational Loan Program and lending directly to student
borrowers); Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 4, at 232 (noting that the cost of higher
education has been increasing faster than the rate of inflation).
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1087(a) (2012) (authorizing direct federal student lending programs and
repayment terms); 20 U.S.C. § 1098(e) (income-based repayment); 34 C.F.R. § 685.209
(2017) (income contingent repayment programs); 34 C.F.R. § 685.219 (2017) (public service
loan forgiveness programs); 34 C.F.R. § 685.221 (2017) (new income-based repayment); FED.
STUDENT AID, INCOME-DRIVEN REPAYMENT PLANS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (2016),
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/income-driven-repayment-q-and-a.pdf
(providing the United States Department of Education's summary of student loan repayment
programs); Austin, supra note 20, at 346-51 (describing the general repayment programs as
well as some additional specialized repayment programs for borrowers in specific occupations
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Fixed amount per month of at least $50 and
repayment permitted over ten years.
Fixed or graduated repayment permitted for up to
twenty-five years for loans in excess of $30,000.
Only available for Federal Family Education Loan
(FFEL) Program loans (does not apply to federal
direct loans). Extends payments for an additional five
years after the standard repayment plan. At least
accrued interest must be paid monthly. No debt
forgiveness at the end of the repayment term.
Payment limited to 20% of adjusted gross income
that exceeds 150% of the poverty line with a
maximum loan payment of the ten-year loan service
payment. Interest capitalized until outstanding
principal is 10% greater than original balance.
Balance forgiven after twenty-five years as a taxable
event. Married couples combine income only if they
file jointly. Available to all borrowers. No
occupation or hardship restrictions. Applies to all
direct loans not in default, including consolidation
loans taken to repay a parent PLUS loan.
Requires "partial financial hardship" of IBR
repayments being lower than standard repayments.
Monthly payments limited to 15% of adjusted gross
income that exceeds 150% of the poverty line with a
maximum loan payment of the ten-year loan service
payment. Interest accrues except on certain
subsidized loans during the first three years of IBR
and unpaid interest capitalized if borrower leaves or
no longer qualifies for IBR. Balance forgiven after
or health conditions); Student Loans as Taxes, supra note 12, at 516-17; Income-Driven
Repayment, supra note 4, at 252; Doug Redleman & Scott Weingart, Collection of Student
Loans: A Critical Examination, 20 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & Soc. JUST. 215, 227-34 (2014)
(providing a comprehensive overview of student loan repayment programs and also noting that
private repayment programs, such as Loan Repayment Assistance Programs, are available).
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twenty-five years as a taxable event. Married
couples combine income only if they file jointly.
Applies to all borrowers. No occupation restrictions.
Requires "partial financial hardship." Payments
limited to 10% of adjusted gross income that exceeds
150% of the poverty line with a maximum loan
payment of the ten-year loan service payment.
Interest accrues and capitalized in the same manner
as Old IBR. Balance forgiven after twenty years as a
taxable event. Married couples combine income only
if they file jointly. Applies only to new borrowers
after July 1, 2014. No occupation restrictions.
Requires "partial financial hardship." Payments
limited to 10% of adjusted gross income that exceeds
150% of the poverty line with a maximum monthly
payment of the ten-year loan service payment.
Capitalized interest capped at 10% of the original
loan balance and interest not charged for up to three
years if payments not sufficient to cover interest.
Balance forgiven after twenty years as a taxable
event. Married couples only combine income if they
file jointly. Applies to new borrowers as of October
1, 2007, as long as the borrower received a loan
disbursement after October 1, 2011. No occupation
restrictions.
No "partial financial hardship" requirement.
Monthly payments limited to 10% of adjusted gross
income that exceeds 150% of the poverty line with
no set maximum limit on the monthly repayment.
Interest accrues except on certain subsidized loans
during the first three years of REPAYE and unpaid
interest capitalized if borrower leaves or no longer
qualifies for REPAYE. Undergraduate loans forgiven
after twenty years with graduate loans forgiven after
twenty-five years. Combines income for married
couples filing separately. Available to borrowers
with debt prior to 2007. No occupation restrictions.
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Public Service Same payment terms as the above income-driven
Loan Forgiveness repayment plans. Federal direct loan balance
(PSLF) forgiven after ten years as a tax-free event. Available
only to borrowers working for the government or
certain nonprofit organizations. FFEL loans
ineligible for forgiveness unless part of a separate
forgiveness program for teachers in disadvantaged
schools as part of a disability discharge.
Despite the fact that these repayment programs potentially create a sea
of confusion that inhibits their efficiency and utilization, student loans would
become an economically significant burden on a large number of borrowers
if these programs (or a more simplified version of these programs) did not
exist.22 If borrowers were all forced to make payments under the standard
repayment program, there would be little recourse from the devastating
consequences of default, given that it is exceedingly difficult to discharge
student loans in bankruptcy, and there is no statute of limitations on student
loan repayment.23 Under these programs, the federal government still
22. See Redleman & Weingart, supra note 21, at 290-91.
23. See Austin, supra note 20, at 363-64, 372-73, 400-07 (describing trends in student
loan default rates and the various policies behind non-dischargability of student loans in
bankruptcy); see also Simkovic, supra note 2, at 609-13. Without the ability to either manage
repayment or have the debt discharged, the defaulting borrowers would be subject to a variety
of negative consequences, including government seizure of wages, tax refunds and credits, and
payments from social security, as well as a damaged credit rating that could make other forms
of borrowing difficult and more expensive. Austin, supra note 20, at 407; see also Redleman
& Weingart, supra note 2 1, at 240-41, 243 (describing other negative consequences of default,
such as ineligibility for deferments and certain debt forgiveness programs, ineligibility for
further federal assistance funds for any Title IV program, acceleration of the loan, and
assessment of collection costs, fees, or penalties). Even in the absence of default, borrowers
who struggle to manage payments can experience practical restrictions in career choice
because of compensation concerns, delaying significant life events like marriage and having
children, and negative health consequences associated with excessive levels of debt. Austin,
supra note 20, at 401-02; Eryk Wachnik, The Student Debt Crisis: The Impact of the Obama
Administration's "Pay As You Earn" Plan on Millions of Current & Former Students, 24
Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 442, 443, 446 (2012). As currently constituted, these loan repayment
programs ameliorate these risks significantly not only by reducing payments but by limiting
the borrower's debt to income ratio which protects their credit worthiness even if the
outstanding principal amount of the loan is high. Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 4, at
288; Philip G. Schrag, Failing Law Schools Brian Tamanaha's Misguided Missile, 26 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 387, 402-04 (2013) [hereinafter Misguided Missile] ("[W]hat matters most
for underwriting purposes is the borrower's financial ability to repay any new loan, as
measured by his or her existing monthly loan repayment obligations.").
2017] 89
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receives a net financial benefit as federal student lending remains a revenue-
producing activity for the government.24
John Brooks has persuasively argued that this model of student loan
repayment is best analyzed as a system of taxation, or "quasi-public
spending," rather than pure loan repayment.25 As Brooks explains, under
these repayment programs, government funds are used to finance student
education and are repaid with a percentage of students' incomes, making
these programs appear very similar to a tax imposed to pay for a government
benefit.26 Brooks acknowledges that the analogy is not a perfect one, given
that progressivity disappears at higher income levels; the "tax" is not due for
life (rather, it is only due until the loan is repaid); there is currently a
significant balloon payment for forgiven loans that produces taxable
cancellation of debt income; the Department of Education, rather than the
Internal Revenue Service, administers the programs; and the benefit is
predominantly funded by taxpayers who took out student loans (although
taxpayers as a whole still fund a portion of the debt forgiveness).27 Despite
these differences between the loan repayment programs and the income tax,
"[t]he combination of income-based repayment and loan forgiveness means
that for many students, the nominal debt amount and nominal interest rates
24. Austin, supra note 20, at 342-43 ("The Department of Education anticipates that
federal subsidized student loan activity (including new loans and consolidation of existing
loans) will generate $38.9 billion in revenue for the government in 2012 and approximately
$36.8 billion in 2013. The federal government expects to earn 20.08% on each dollar of loans
originated in 2013."); Gregory Crespi, Should We Defuse the "Tax Bomb" Facing Lawyers
Who Are Enrolled in Income-Based Student Repayment Plans?, 68 S.C. L. REv. 117, 188
(2017) [hereinafter Tax Bomb] (noting that, even accounting for government costs and default
risk, "there is still such a large margin between the high nominal interest rates charged
borrowers and the Treasury's very low funding costs that those loans will still on balance
generate a substantial annual profit.").
25. Student Loans as Taxes, supra note 12, at 513; Income-Driven Repayment, supra
note 4, at 231.
26. Student Loans as Taxes, supra note 12, at 515 ("Whether we call the levy a loan
service payment or a tax doesn't change the fact that a percentage of individuals' income is
being used to fund a government benefit (federal loans being essentially available to
anyone)."); see also Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 4, at 258, 259-60. This tax system
even has some level of progressivity because full payers are subsidizing those who only repay
a portion of their loan before having it forgiven. Student Loans as Taxes, supra note 12, at 513;
see Misguided Missile, supra note 23, at 404-05 ("[I]t is progressive, providing the greatest
benefits to those who perform at least ten years of public service, smaller benefits to those who
have lower incomes but do not perform ten years of public service, and none at all to those
with very high incomes."); Simkovic, supra note 2, at 590 (noting that the failure of current
lending programs to price loans based on risk creates a redistributive system in which the
riskier students are subsidized by the less risky ones).
27. Student Loans as Taxes, supra note 12, at 514-515; Income-Driven Repayment,
supra note 4, at 259-63.
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are irrelevant-all that matters is their income. It's hard to think of that as
actually a loan." 28
III. ECONOMIC DISTORTIONS CAUSED BY CURRENT INCOME-BASED
STUDENT LOAN REPAYMENT PROGRAMS
The income-based student loan repayment programs described above
help students afford higher education by prohibiting unmanageable debt
payments that would significantly inhibit their ability to begin successful
lives after graduation.29 These programs, particularly PSLF, also provide an
incentive for borrowers to enter public service careers, which, in turn,
broaden the availability of essential public services.30 Several structural
elements, however, create distortions and moral hazard risk that inhibit the
efficiency of these programs. Specifically, tying capped repayments and
eventual debt forgiveness to adjusted gross income does not appropriately
factor in overall borrower ability to pay; insulates institutions of higher
education from market pressure; provides an inefficient preference for
government and nonprofit work; potentially further exacerbates many of the
problems with the joint return filing system; and creates opportunities for
borrowers to manipulate these programs with tax planning and asset
protection techniques. As a result, the current income-based student loan
repayment system does not efficiently accomplish its goal of providing relief
to only those borrowers who actually need it.
28. Student Loans as Taxes, supra note 12, at 516; Income-Driven Repayment, supra
note 4, at 263. Brooks observes that financing education through this "quasi-public spending"
model has benefits in that it provides a public good without as much of a government
expenditure and reduces tax distortions that could occur because the taxes required to fimd the
program end up being lower than they otherwise would be. Income-Driven Repayment, supra
note 4, at 272-73. Indeed, an open empirical question is how much of a government subsidy is
involved in these student loan repayment programs because, while the subsidy to individual
borrowers can be significant, the absence of these programs might curtail participation to the
point that the overall change to government revenue is modest. See Gregory Crespi, Will the
Income-Based Repayment Program Enable Law Schools to Continue to Provide "Harvard-
Style" Legal Education?, 67 SMU L. REV. 52, 130-36 (2014) [hereinafter Harvard-Style
Education]. Furthermore, even if student loan repayment programs involve a short-term
government subsidy, they may result in overall higher tax revenues from more students who
become successful and earn higher incomes. Simkovic, supra note 2, at 601-02.
29. Wachnik, supra note 23, at 451.
30. Harvard-Style Education, supra note 28, at 130.
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A. Income-Based Repayment Programs Do Not Appropriately
Consider Overall Borrower Ability to Pay
Current student loan repayment programs attempt to tie the repayment
obligation for a public benefit to a borrower's ability to pay by solely
focusing on the borrower's income and, in some cases, the income of the
borrower's spouse.3' This approach mirrors the manner in which the federal
government attempts to allocate to a particular taxpayer that taxpayer's share
of his or her tax obligation based on the taxpayer's income-rather than the
taxpayer's overall wealth under a theory that the taxpayer's income serves
as the best proxy for the taxpayer's ability to contribute to public revenue so
that the tax burden is not overly borne by savers.32 In the context of a pure
tax, an income-based approach makes sense. However, while student loans
have tax-like attributes, they also have loan-like attributes.33 In addition, if
one were to de-emphasize the loan-like aspects and view student loans
primarily through a tax prism, student loans more resemble established tax
liabilities for an individual borrower. Whether treated as loans or established
tax liabilities, repayment of these types of liabilities typically focuses on
overall borrower wealth, rather than solely on borrower income, as the best
proxy for ability to pay a characteristic currently missing from the current
approach.
To illustrate this problem, consider the following example from Jason
Delisle and Alexander Holt, who discuss the effects of income-based
repayment on a hypothetical law student named Robert who has $150,000 in
debt at an interest rate of 6%.34
Robert lands a job making $70,000 a year, with his wife making
$80,000. In his first year of repayment under IBR, his monthly
payment will be $0 . . .. In his second year of repayment, his
monthly payment will be $238 on what is now a $159,000 loan,
thanks to a year's worth of interest .... First, Robert can exclude
his wife's income from the calculation by filing separate income
taxes . . . . Second, Robert's payment is not calculated off of his
31. See supra Part III (describing the specifics of how current student loan repayment
programs take into account borrower income).
32. Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 53 TAx L. REv. 263, 365-66
(1999).
33. See supra notes 25-28 and surrounding text.
34. Jason Delisle & Alexander Holt, Our Washington Post Op-Ed Example Explained,
NEW AM. (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/edcentral/
washington-post-ibr/.
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total income, but rather his Adjusted Gross Income, $59,500, which
is lower because pre-tax expenses are automatically excluded. Even
though Robert earns $70,000, his $3,000 in health insurance
premiums, $4,000 in retirement savings, and his $3,500 contribution
to a dependent care account are excluded from that figure, resulting
in an Adjusted Gross Income of $59,500 . ... After that, he
subtracts another $30,900, which is the exemption he receives under
IBR for himself, his wife, and his child as a basic cost-of-living
allowance . . . . Robert eams an annual raise of 4 percent, and a
promotion in his 10th year of repayment brings his salary to
$150,000 that year. By his 20th year of repayment he eams
$222,000 per year . . .. He still has a $166,000 balance at that point,
more than he borrowed, which the government then forgives [but
taxes as income] . . . . Had Robert qualified for [public service loan
forgiveness], he would have $201,734 forgiven after making total
payments of only $38,266.35
Note that in Delisle and Holt's example, their calculations would not
change if Robert had significant assets at any point during the life of the
loan, whether these assets resulted from pre-existing savings, unrealized
investment gains, gifts, inheritance, or other sources, provided that those
assets did not produce income that would change Robert's adjusted gross
income. Thus, if at the end of the loan repayment period Robert's assets
were of sufficient size to pay off the loan, either in full or in part, the loan
would still be forgiven provided the income figures did not change
significantly.
B. Higher Education Insulated from Market Pressure
Because current student loan repayment programs remove much of the
risk involved in students borrowing large sums of money to finance their
educations, institutions of higher education do not have to worry as much
about the market pressures that would ordinarily be brought to bear by
producing high debt loads and poor employment outcomes.36 Under these
repayment programs, institutions are inherently less sensitive to their
35. Id
36. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Problems with Income Based Repayment, and the Charge
ofElitism: Responses to Schrag and Chambliss, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521, 532-33 (2013)
("[S]chools can entice students by telling them that they need not fear the size of the debt they
will take on because their monthly payments will be capped at a manageable level and the
remaining debt will be forgiven.").
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graduates' career outcomes because the institution can still attract students
who borrow to pay high tuition costs without much price sensitivity to what
those costs are, and who are only concerned with obtaining employment that
allows them to make the minimum monthly payments under these programs,
even if they can never repay the full amount of the loan.3 7 This problem is
especially pronounced in graduate and professional schools, which have
much higher tuitions and significantly higher limits on the amount of
borrowing eligible for these programs.38 Further exacerbating this market
distortion is the fact that students receive very little information from lenders
about the financial viability of their educational choices, because loans are
not priced to account for the risk associated with a borrower pursuing
37. Harvard-Style Education, supra note 28, at 134-36 (discussing Jason Delisle &
Alex Holt, Safety Net or Windfall: Examining Changes to Income-Based Repayment for
Federal Student Loans, NEW AM. FOUND. (Oct. 16, 2012),
https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/policy-papers/safety-net-or-windfall); James
Audette, Defining "Gainful Employment" and Other Reforms in Federal Educational Lending,
38 J.C. & U.L. 167, 174 (2011). Audette quotes Congressman Souder of Indiana who
summarized the potential moral hazard in these student loan repayment programs as follows:
An income-based repayment program would eliminate once and for all any need for
students to weigh their choice of college or university against which type of career
they plan to enter after the degree. It's a disconnect with capitalism because you
don't have to say, if I get this number of degrees and go this far, how is my job
going to repay this? Should I go to a local campus? Should I go to a lower priced
college? It's disconnected now based from your choice of employment. While the
government surely has a role in increasing access to education, this program would
totally strip any incoming college student from making a responsible choice. It's
kind-hearted but reckless.
Id. (citing 153 Cong. Rec. H7, 538-39 (daily ed. July 11, 2007) (statement of Rep. Souder)).
This moral hazard could be inadvertent as well as intentional, given that students may
mistakenly overestimate the earning potential of their chosen field. Simkovic, supra note 2, at
583-84 ("According to one study of undergraduates at the University of California at San
Diego, students typically mistake expected wages by 20%. According to another study of male
undergraduates at Duke, students typically overestimate wages in their own field . . . .");
Austin, supra note 20, at 411 (noting that a large number of students do not appreciate how
difficult it is to repay a large sum of money and also overestimate their ability to earn top
grades and secure top-earning jobs). In addition, borrowers are not the only ones with a
potential moral hazard; schools can be equally tempted to unduly raise tuition knowing that
students will borrow to pay higher tuition in an environment with significantly reduced risk.
Tamanaha, supra note 36, at 534; Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 4, at 284-86
(identifying the moral hazard risk and noting that for-profit colleges and even Brooks'
university employer have been accused of exhibiting this morally hazardous behavior).
38. Harvard-Style Education, supra note 28, at 134-36 (discussing Jason Delisle &
Alex Holt, Safety Net or Windfall: Examining Changes to Income-Based Repayment for
Federal Student Loans, NEW AM. FOUND. (Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.newamerica.org/
education-policy/policy-papers/safety-net-or-windfall).
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education unlikely to lead to employment paying sufficient compensation to
justify the cost.3 9
Current underutilization of these student loan repayment programs and
other market constraints on tuition have served as a counter-lever to limit the
temptation for institutions to increase costs indiscriminately under the
assumption that the government will pick up the tab.40 In addition, because
these programs do not properly account for borrower risk, institutions of
higher education have an incentive to provide opportunities to students who
might be at risk for lower earning potential as graduates.41 Certainly, in
many instances, institutions of higher education are properly motivated
under the current system to provide educational opportunities to students
who might not otherwise receive these opportunities in a risk-based model.
Nevertheless, this moral hazard risk is real and cannot be completely
discounted just because borrowers and institutions have not yet fully
exploited it.42
39. Benjamin M. Leff & Heather Hughes, Student Loan Derivatives: Improving on
Income-Based Approaches to Financing Law School, 61 VILL. L. REv. 99, 112 (2016);
Simkovic, supra note 2, at 628-46; Tamanaha, supra note 36, at 532-33.
40. Misguided Missile, supra note 23, at 418-19 (noting that institutional price
competition and student resistance to take on large amounts of debt regardless of repayment
options contribute to keeping tuition increases in check); Gretchen Morgenson, A Student Loan
System Stacked Against the Borrower, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/ 11 busines s/a-student-loan-system-stacked-against-the-borr
ower.html. Further contributing to the problem of borrowers not taking advantage of current
student loan repayment programs is the fact that the largest loan servicer for these loans may
have been actively discouraging students from participating in these programs, as alleged in a
recent lawsuit against Navient and Sallie Mae filed by the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau and the Attorneys General for Washington and Illinois. Stacy Crowley & Jessica
Silver-Greenberg, Student Loan Collector Cheated Millions, Lawsuits Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/business/dealbook/student-loans-navient-
lawsuit.html. These plans may not remain underutilized for much longer, however, given that
they have seen increasing participation rates as they have become better publicized. Tax Bomb,
supra note 24, at 92. Nevertheless, even if more students participate in these programs, many
may lack the financial discipline necessary to exploit this potential distortion fully. Id. at 117.
41. Jonathan A. LaPlante, Note, Congress's Tax Bomb: Income-Based Repayment and
Disarming a Problem Facing Student Loan Borrowers, 100 CORNELL L. REv. 703, 706
(2015).
42. The moral hazard problem potentially creates a reinforcing behavioral cycle in
which student loan repayment programs incentivize bad behavior, which exacerbates the
amount of debt that cannot be repaid by vulnerable borrowers and thus necessitates additional
government relief in the future. See Zacks, supra note 10, at 328 (arguing that, in the context
of the tax exemption for certain mortgage debt forgiveness, such relief was justified based on
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C. Taxation of Debt Forgiveness Outside of PSLF Provides an
Inefficient Preference for Government and Nonprofit Workers over
Private Sector Employment
The tax-free debt forgiveness of the PSLF program provides a
substantial benefit to public service and nonprofit employees with significant
student loans that is not available to borrowers in the private sector. Under
PSLF, outstanding student debt is forgiven after ten years as opposed to
twenty or twenty-five years.43 In addition, because PSLF eligible debt is
currently forgiven tax-free while non-PSLF debt is taxable, borrowers with
debts forgiven under PSLF receive a benefit that can be worth up to
$100,000.44 The favorable treatment of student loans under the PSLF
program is justified with the argument that the government can forgo more
revenue in the PSLF program if it incentivizes borrowers to fill needs in
public service that they might not otherwise accept because such positions
are often compensated at lower levels than private sector positions.45 i
essence, the PSLF program amounts to the government providing additional
compensation for employees in the public or nonprofit sectors and
effectively provides a "double subsidy" to the borrowers who receive this
benefit.46
It is unclear whether providing favorable student loan treatment to these
public service employees is the most efficient way to incentivize public
service. Simply providing higher wages to government workers (and
incentivizing higher wages to nonprofit employees) would be a superior
mechanism to encourage greater labor participation in this arena because
higher compensation would incentivize the entire labor force, rather than just
the members with student loans.47 increasing wages would also provide a
43. See discussion supra Part II.
44. Tax Bomb, supra note 24, at 131.
45. Sheffrin, supra note 14, at 1193.
46. Id.
47. Simkovic, supra note 2, at 593 (noting that higher salaries "could improve the
quality of public service personnel by making such jobs attractive to a wider range of qualified
applicants, increasing competition for public service jobs ... [and] could also help prevent
public service careers from becoming segregated along class divisions"). Only incentivizing
those with student loans also creates the risk that some borrowers might "settle for ill-fitting or
lower-paying positions simply to avoid repayment rather than seeking to find employment that
will allow them (or rather force them) to pay that debt." Sheffrin, supra note 14, at 1193.
Exacerbating this problem is the fact that some borrowers have selected employment positions
to take advantage of PSLF, only to have the government retroactively change its determination
that the borrowers were employed in a qualifying position. Ron Lieber, They Thought They
Qualifled for Student Loan Forgiveness, Years Later, the Government Changes its Mind, N.Y.
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more direct incentive to student borrowers-to which they would likely be
more responsive to-than the indirect incentives buried in the tax treatment
of loan forgiveness.48
D. Certain Married Couples are Disadvantaged by Being Forced to
File Married Filing Separately and Give Up Tax Benefits Only
Available if They Filed Jointly
Married couples are potentially disadvantaged under the current student
loan repayment system because repayment is tied to adjusted gross income
as reflected on the tax return.49 Because married couples filing jointly
(which is often, but not always, the more favorable filing status for married
couples) would have to include both spouses' incomes in the repayment
calculation, even if only one spouse has student debt, they could become
ineligible for student loan repayment programs if one spouse has low income
and high debt, while the other has high income and low or no debt.o In
addition, married couples in which both spouses have student debt subject to
current repayment programs end up having their incomes counted twice,
which results in the couple paying much more of their discretionary income
for student loans than they would if they filed separately or remained
single.5 ' Accordingly, couples in this situation are incentivized to either
forgo marriage or give up other tax benefits that are not available to couples
who elect married filing separately.5 2 Even if taxpayers do not necessarily
TIMES (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/20/your-money/student-loans/they-
thought-they-qualified-for-loan-forgiveness-years-later-the-answer-is-no.html.
48. Sheffrin, supra note 14, at 1193 (arguing that students are often poor planners
because of "time-inconsistent preference[]" and often lack the information they need to factor
in the ultimate tax consequences of loan forgiveness when they make a decision to take on
more debt).
49. Jonathan M. Layman, Note, Forgiven But Not Forgotten: Taxation of Forgiven
Student Loans Under the Income-Based-Repayment Plan, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 131, 155 (2011).
50. Id. at 154; Victoria J. Haneman, The Collision of Student Loan Debt and Joint
Marital Taxation, 35 VA. TAX REV. 223, 244 (2016) (noting that, while there are some
circumstances in which married filing separately can produce tax advantages, "[a]s a rule of
thumb, however, filing separate returns usually causes a married couple to lose far more than
they gain"); see Andrew Grossman & Nick Canton, Married Borrowers and IBR: A Trap for
the Unwary, 122 TAX NOTES 1496 (2009).
51. See Grossman & Canton, supra note 50.
52. Philip G. Schrag, Federal Student Loan Repayment Assistance for Public Interest
Lawyers and Other Employees of Government and Nonprofit Organizations, 36 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 27, 53 (2007) [hereinafter Federal Student Loan Repayment] (noting that married
taxpayers who elect married filing separately give up the student loan interest deduction, the
earned income tax credit, and the child care credit, while becoming subject to higher income
tax rates at higher income levels); see Grossman & Canton, supra note 50; Sheffrin, supra note
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directly respond to these incentives, significant inequities result from
taxpayers with student loans being forced into one of these choices.53
Making this choice is inherently complex because of the combination of
economic and social factors as well as the forecasting variables involved,
and a large number of couples considering marriage are forced to confront
this complexity while dealing with all of the other decisions that accompany
family formation.54 Couples living in community property states who file
separately are treated differently from couples in non-community property
states because of the requirement that couples divide their income on each
return, which creates additional horizontal equity problems."
Compounding the inequitable treatment that married couples face in the
current system is the fact that each spouse generally does not bear an equal
share of the disparate treatment. Women often bear the brunt of the
disadvantages married couples can face in the current student loan
repayment regime.5 6 Due to taxes, the lack of gender equality in pay,
expenses related to work, and increasing child care costs, married women
are often confronted with the fact that remaining in the workplace while
having a family causes them to realize less economic value from their work
than similarly situated men.5 7 Even unmarried women are harmed in this
14, at 1193-94 (providing an example of why married couples with a high earning/low debt
and high debt/low earning spouse will often elect married filing separately status to avoid
losing eligibility for the benefits under the current student loan repayment system). Couples in
this situation who do not wish both spouses' incomes to be considered will also not be able to
participate in the REPAYE program because that program considers both spouses' incomes
regardless of their filing status. See sources cited supra note 21 and accompanying text.
53. See Lawrence Zelenak, For Better and Worse: The Differing Income Tax
Treatments of Marriage at Different Income Levels, 93 N.C. L. REV. 783, 794-95 (2015).
54. Haneman, supra note 50, at 258-60 (noting that this complexity could contribute to
the underutilization program discussed in supra note 40 and accompanying text).
55. Id. at 223. But cf FED. STUDENT AID, supra note 21, at 19 (noting that some loan
servicers for borrowers in community property states may allow them to submit alternative
documentation of income to avoid this disparate treatment, but these decisions are currently
left to the loan servicers).
56. Haneman, supra note 50, at 261-62.
57. See id. at 265; see also Shannon Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing the Working
Family: Uncle Sam and the Childcare Squeeze, 114 MICH. L. REV. 559, 559 (2016); Amy C.
Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the Gendered Nature of
the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL. 241, 302 (1997) (quoting Laura A. Davis, Note, A Feminist
Justification for the Adoption of an Individual Filing System, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 197, 232
(1988)); Lora Cicconi, Note, Competing Goals Amidst the "Opt-Out" Revolution: An
Examination of Gender-Based Tax Reform in Light of New Data on Female Labor Supply, 42
GoNz. L. REV. 257, 264-71 (2007). Cicconi describes the features of the tax code that prevent
gender neutrality by discouraging the participation of secondary earners in the labor market,
which has the practical effect of discouraging women's labor participation. Id. These include:
(1) the joint filing system, which causes the secondary income in an equal-income couple to be
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system in that there is an aggregation effect from discouraging married
women from work that sends a social signal that women should not work.
This effect on women is perhaps currently being borne more by married
couples as a whole, as an increasing percentage of married couples become
two-eamer couples,5 9 but these inequalities have not been eradicated,
making it more difficult for women than men to pay off student loans and
potentially framing a choice between pursuing an education and
participating in the workforce or remaining home to raise children.60
E. Debt Forgiveness Allows Borrower Gaming to Avoid Repayment
Most of the current student loan repayment programs require a "partial
financial hardship" for participation and tie repayments to the borrower's
income in relation to the poverty line and, crucially, cap the monthly
repayment before eventually forgiving the debt.6' This structure has the
unintended side effect of allowing some students, who anticipate entering
fields with lower incomes, to take free money from the government that is
taxed at higher marginal rates while providing rate shifting benefits to couples with one spouse
having a higher income; (2) the failure to tax imputed income, which provides a tax preference
to the work done caring for home that is often borne more by women than by men; (3) limited
deductions available for childcare; and (4) the social security tax system, which provides a
lower incentive for secondary earners who might be paying the full social security tax after the
primary earner has passed the income threshold for the tax and which provides spousal
benefits that potentially make it better for secondary earners to claim benefits under the
primary earner's earnings. Id.
58. Christian, supra note 57, at 302.
59. See McCormack, supra note 57, at 563-64; see also Stephanie Hunter McMahon,
To Have and to Hold: What Does Love (of Money) Have to Do with Joint Tax Filing?, 11
NEV. L.J. 718, 750-51 (2011) (noting that women's wage elasticity has been declining and, as
a result, "[a]s of 2007 53.1 percent of all married couples had two earners, and increasingly
this is true for wealthier couples"). Also potentially mitigating the negative effects on women
is the fact that for some married couples there is now a strong incentive to file separate returns
in order to remain in the current student loan repayment programs. As a result, potentially
fewer couples are subject to the negative effects of the joint return system that discourage
women from entering the labor force. See Christian, supra note 57, at 302. Furthermore,
women with student loans inherently have a stronger incentive to participate fully in the labor
force. However, these mitigating effects are accompanied by spouses having to give up other
tax benefits only available to joint filers, which, as long as joint filing persists as an option,
continues to impose a penalty on women.
60. Haneman, supra note 50, at 265-66. Admittedly, all women may not experience the
same effects given that "[e]ven if an identifiable 'best' policy exists for women overall, such a
policy may not coincide with the best interests of individual women or of certain identifiable
groups of women." Christian, supra note 57, at 375.
61. Note that REPAYE does not cap the monthly repayment and, as a result, does not
require a "partial financial hardship" for a borrower to participate. See discussion supra Part II.
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unnecessary for their education without ever having to repay it. 62 This
distortion occurs when students borrow the maximum amount for which
they are qualified, regardless of whether they need all of the funds, to pay
for their education and then enter one of the income-based repayment
programs that cap repayments and conclude in debt forgiveness.63 Even
students with significant assets, owned either at the time of borrowing or
acquired during the term of repayment, would potentially be eligible for this
benefit if their assets were structured in a manner so as to not generate
significant income.64 While the eventual debt forgiveness outside of public
service loan forgiveness would still be taxable, this deferred tax on the debt
forgiveness is not as significant of a burden as it initially appears to be due
to inflation,65 and it can be planned for by setting aside either a portion of
the borrowed funds in advance or a portion of future income in order to pay
the eventual tax bill. 66 Furthermore, although taxable debt forgiveness
occurs at a point in which many borrowers are likely to have significant
assets that, even if exempt from creditors, would prevent them from taking
advantage of the deferral of income under the insolvency exception in
Section 108(b),67 the amount of time that borrowers have to plan for this
62. Harvard-Style Education, supra note 28, at 81.
63. Id.; Leff & Hughes, supra note 39, at 100 ("The government [student lending]
programs create incentives for students to over-borrow by focusing government funds on those
students who borrow the most. . . .").
For example, a law student may take on more than $150,000 to pay for a juris doctor
(J.D.) program, knowing she does not ever want to practice law. In fact, she could
get her J.D. and work as a park ranger (assuming she is otherwise qualified), make
yearly payments nowhere close to the rate necessary to pay off the accrued interest,
and then cancel the entire principal after ten years because she has worked in a
qualifying public interest position.
Audette, supra note 37, at 169.
64. Layman, supra note 49, at 157.
65. See Tax Bomb, supra note 24, at 184 (noting that, because of inflation, "the 'real'
burden of the tax bomb for IBR or PAYE Plan enrollees will only be approximately half as
large as it would be were those tax obligations to be denominated in dollars of the same
purchasing power as those borrowed in the underlying student loans").
66. Id. at 196; Federal Student Loan Repayment, supra note 52, at 57-58. But see Tax
Bomb, supra note 24, at 131 (noting that "coming up with the funds necessary to satisfy such a
large tax obligation . .. will nevertheless be a substantial burden for many . .. who may have
lacked the foresight to plan for this tax liability" or who have been unable to do so). This
incentive to overborrow also creates an incentive for graduate schools to provide the highest
possible estimate concerning cost of attendance so as to provide opportunities for students to
engage in overborrowing. Harvard-Style Education, supra note 28, at 81 ("A high estimate of
these expenses will provide those schools with a competitive advantage in recruiting students
over other otherwise comparable schools that may estimate these expenses more
conservatively.").
67. Tax Bomb, supra note 24, at 135.
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debt forgiveness would possibly allow some taxpayers to engage in planning
techniques designed to minimize assets and maximize liabilities for the
purpose of reducing or eliminating the tax liability with the insolvency
exception.68 For borrowers anticipating entering careers in public service or
the nonprofit sector, this potential distortion has an even greater benefit
because the excess borrowing will be forgiven tax-free, negating the need to
set aside any of the proceeds or future income for taxes.69 This potential
distortion is perhaps viewed as an unavoidable cost of achieving the goal of
increasing participation in these student loan repayment programs because,
without partial or complete debt forgiveness, borrowers as a whole have less
of an incentive to enroll in the program.70 Admittedly, how much of a
problem this will be is somewhat speculative at this point, given that much
of the debt forgiveness under current income-based repayment approaches
has yet to occur, and there is not readily available data regarding the overall
financial picture of those enrolled in the program. Nevertheless, the current
system creates a potential for gaming that would most benefit borrowers
with the highest loan balances, who often tend to be borrowers who incurred
their debt in graduate or professional school and are most likely to
68. Steven Chung, Defusing the Student Loan Forgiveness Tax Bomb, LAWYERIST.COM
(Mar. 10, 2017), https://1awyerist.com/defusing-student-loan-interest-tax-bomb/. These
strategies can include gifting away assets, leasing rather than purchasing as many assets as
possible, temporarily becoming an employee rather than a business owner, deferring income
until after the date of loan forgiveness, deferring the payment of as many liabilities as possible,
and working to transfer retirement accounts to others. Id. Admittedly, such strategies are not a
complete panacea because, if taken to the extreme, they could result in an unacceptable level
of asset depletion, and, even if the insolvency exception is triggered, the exception has an
associated cost in the form of the taxpayer having to reduce other tax attributes, which causes
tax deferral rather than complete forgiveness. Id In addition, planning possibilities are not
unlimited in this area because of fraudulent transfer laws. Haleh Naimi, The Definition of
Assets Under the Insolvency Exclusion, 136 TAx NOTES 1035 (2012).
69. Harvard-Style Education, supra note 28, at 82. These outsized benefits associated
with public service loan forgiveness could eventually apply to all student loans if efforts to
make all of the debt forgiveness in these programs tax-free are successful; see id. at 91 (noting
several calls for making all of the forgiven student debt tax-free, which included Senator
Hillary Clinton's unsuccessful attempt to introduce legislation to this effect in 2007, but
pointing out that "[t]here is, however, no assurance that such legislation will be adopted given
the currently partisan and gridlocked Congressional legislative process and given the great
political sensitivity of tax law changes"); see also Sheffrin, supra note 14, at 1193-94
(providing an example of how student borrowers can manipulate the current system by
borrowing more than is needed to finance their education without having to repay the full
amount in the future).
70. Harvard-Style Education, supra note 28, at 129.
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understand (or have access to people who understand) the available planning
opportunities.7'
IV. TOWARDS A MORE ACCURATE AND TARGETED STUDENT LOAN RELIEF
SYSTEM
Current student loan repayment programs provide relief to borrowers
who have high levels of student loan debt without providing complete relief
in order to incentivize responsible borrowing and prevent significant revenue
losses to the government.72 Congress correctly appears to want to provide
relief as needed while ensuring students have some "skin in the game." 73
However, because of the distortions described above, this balance could be
better achieved by making repayment a function of a borrower's overall
ability to pay, rather than a function of the borrower's income. As a
component of tying repayment to a borrower's ability to pay, debt
forgiveness should be limited to circumstances in which there is a high
likelihood that the taxpayer will never be able to repay the full amount of the
loan in order to prevent debt forgiveness from being available to borrowers
who would still have an ability to pay.74
Of course, eliminating or extending debt forgiveness increases the
burden on students who find that their other life expenses-related to family
formation and retirement saving-increase as they get older.7 ' By keeping
the repayment burden manageable and fair by making it a function of actual
ability to pay, as opposed to a function of adjusted gross income for a set
period of time, limiting complete debt forgiveness is nevertheless justifiable
71. Id. at 134 (discussing Jason Delisle & Alex Holt, Safety Net or Windfall: Examining
Changes to Income-Based Repayment for Federal Student Loans, NEW AM. FOUND. (Oct. 16,
2012), https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/policy-papers/safety-net-or-windfall).
72. LaPlante, supra note 41, at 710; Tax Bomb, supra note 24, at 186-88
("[E]liminating the tax bomb would create tax revenue losses of upwards of one billion dollars
per year or more by 2039 even if one considers only the tax bomb impacts upon law graduates
and not upon other Plan enrollees."). Note, however, that this loss could be somewhat
mitigated by the profits generated by the above market interest rates that the government
charged on the loans prior to the debt forgiveness. See discussion supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
73. LaPlante, supra note 41, at 715.
74. At least one member of Congress, Rep. Thomas Petri (R-WI), has proposed
eliminating debt forgiveness until the borrower's death, although this proposal has included a
focus on overall ability to pay. Misguided Missile, supra note 23, at 406.
75. Tamanaha, supra note 36, at 528-29.
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because borrower burden is still effectively balanced with the goal of loan
repayment.76
Due to the tax-like components of federal student loan repayment,
principles of tax collection can be a useful analytical tool because tax
collection procedures already contain a standardized approach for basing
collectability on a taxpayer's ability to pay an assessed liability.77 In
addition, these mechanisms are also useful in that policies justifying
forgiving tax liabilities for some taxpayers and not others, within the bounds
of horizontal equity, are also applicable in the student loan context, for
which similar horizontal equity arguments can be raised in the context of
loan forgiveness.78 Just because borrowers might have borrowed similar
amounts to fund an education does not inherently mean that they possess the
same ability to repay that debt because of inherent restrictions and
underlying inequalities based on factors such as gender and race inequities in
governmental, economic, and societal structures.79 Even if borrowers with
identical debt amounts have identical taxable incomes, they are not
necessarily in an equal position regarding their ability to pay, given all of the
different policy choices that are reflected in the computation of taxable
income in regards to which items of income and expenses receive a tax
preference and which items do not.so
76. Admittedly, this proposal does not solve the problem of tying student loan
repayment completely to the financial benefits received from the education. See Leff &
Hughes, supra note 39, at 112 (advocating for a system of IBR swaps that would be superior to
IBR in tying repayment to post-graduation earnings, causing high earners to subsidize median
and lower earners). While such a system certainly has merit in terms of fostering progressivity
when considering the tax-like characteristics of student loan repayment, proposals such as this
arguably unduly minimize the loan-like characteristics that would suggest that borrowers
should repay their obligations if they can afford to do so, even if their post-graduate earnings
are lower.
77. Shu-Yi Oei, Getting More by Asking Less: Justifying and Reforming Tax Law's
Offer-in-Compromise Procedure, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1077-80 (2012) [hereinafter
Getting More by Asking Less].
78. Id. at 1086-93.
79. Id. at 1087-88. Oei argues that, in the context of imposing a tax liability, "the
inherent dependency of the 'pre-tax income' variable on such inequalities or disparities should
make us question whether it is equitable to tax two persons the same simply because they have
accumulated the same amount of gross income." Id. A similar argument can be made in the
context of student loan repayment, not just because student loans have tax-like qualities, but
also because these same inequalities can create different outcomes for borrowers, even if they
borrow the same amounts to study the same fields at the same institutions.
80. Id. at 1089-90. Income and expense items can receive unprincipled preferences,
both as a matter of explicit policy choice and as a matter of execution, in that even rational
policy preferences can give rise to unprincipled distinctions in practice "[b]ecause of the
idiosyncrasies and intricacies of the on-the-ground operation of the tax system." Id.
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The IRS's OIC procedure, while not applicable whole cloth to student
loan debt relief, can serve as a basis for structuring a Student Loan
Compromise Program (SLCP), given its focus on accomplishing a
fundamentally similar goal: providing liability relief to those who are
unlikely to ever be able to repay it while preserving the government's ability
to collect the liability from those who can pay either currently or in the
future. Section IV.A provides an overview of the OIC Program, and Section
IV.B sketches out what a similarly structured SLCP might look like. Section
IV.C then discusses the benefits of adopting the SLCP for student loan
relief.
A. The Offer in Compromise Program
1. Overview of the Program
The OIC program is authorized under Section 7122 of the Internal
Revenue Code and gives the IRS the ability to compromise a taxpayer's
liability if the taxpayer meets certain conditions. Under the OIC program, a
taxpayer may submit an offer to compromise a tax liability based on one of
the following grounds: (1) doubt as to liability, in which a taxpayer
establishes that there are legitimate defenses to the liability that the taxpayer
may not have raised because the taxpayer did not contest liability in time; (2)
doubt as to collectability, in which the taxpayer establishes that his or her
income and assets are less than the amount of the liability; (3) doubt as to
collectability with special circumstances, in which a taxpayer's income and
assets indicate on their face that the taxpayer can pay more of the liability,
but other factors indicate that the IRS should accept a lower amount; or (4)
effective tax administration, in which the taxpayer establishes that the IRS
should accept an offer on public policy or equitable grounds despite the fact
that the taxpayer does not qualify for one of the other grounds for
acceptance.1
If the IRS accepts the taxpayer's offer, the offer satisfies the taxpayer's
entire liability for the tax years encompassed in the offer, provided that the
taxpayer satisfies certain compliance obligations going forward.8 2 While
81. Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b) (2002); IRM 5.8.4 (July 18, 2017).
82. Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(e) (noting that an accepted offer can only be reopened if it
was accepted based on false information or documents, concealment of the taxpayer's
financial condition, or a mutual mistake of material fact). In addition, the offer could be
terminated if the taxpayer defaults on one of its terms, such as the requirement that complaints
remain on his tax obligations for five years after the date the offer is accepted. I.R.S. Form
656, Section 7(j), (k). Note also that, in addition to the payment of the offer amount, the IRS
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taxpayers cannot submit $0 offers, 3 they can submit nominal offers, even
for very large tax liabilities, and the IRS will accept such nominal offers if
the taxpayer is able to demonstrate that he falls into one of the categories
described above. As a consequence, taxpayers who find themselves in
financial difficulty are provided appropriate relief from tax liabilities as part
of the government's efforts to provide financially distressed taxpayers with a
"fresh start" that allows them to continue with their lives without the
crushing effects of a tax debt that is unlikely to ever be repaid. 84
Although doubt as to liability, one of the grounds upon which an offer
can be submitted, would not be applicable in the student loan context in
which liability is rarely an issue, the remaining grounds are geared more
towards providing relief when liability is not in doubt but when ability to
pay is. Absent a doubt as to liability offer, the IRS's decision regarding
whether to accept the offer, and what the amount of the offer should be, will
be determined in whole or in part by the taxpayer's ability to pay the
liability. 5 Accordingly, the IRS has developed a sophisticated method of
determining a taxpayer's ability to pay, which is a function of the following
four components: (1) the net realizable equity in the taxpayer's assets; (2)
the amount collectible from the taxpayer's future income minus necessary
living expenses over the lesser of the payment period (usually twelve or
twenty-four months) or the statutory recovery period, unless the IRS
requests a collateral future income agreement to insure against the
possibility of the taxpayer's income increasing significantly after the offer
has been accepted; (3) the amount the IRS could collect from third parties on
account of events such as fraudulent transfers or impermissible dissipation
of assets; and (4) assets that are available to the taxpayer but are beyond the
government's reach, such as assets in foreign countries.86 It is this financial
will also apply refunds due to the taxpayer through the calendar year in which the offer was
submitted towards the tax liability that is the subject of the offer. I.R.S. Form 656, Section
7(c).
83. I.R.S. Form 656, Section 4.
84. In 2012, as part of its "Fresh Start Initiative," the IRS streamlined and expanded the
availability of the OIC program in order to allow more financially struggling taxpayers to take
advantage of it. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-31 (Mar. 7, 2012). Consistent with this
policy goal of providing taxpayers with a fresh start, it is highly unlikely that tax liability
cancelled through an offer in compromise would produce cancellation of indebtedness income
that itself would be taxable. See Lawrence Zelenak, Cancellation-of-Indebtedness Income and
Transactional Accounting, 29 VA. TAX REv. 277,315-19 (2009) [hereinafter COD Income].
85. IRM 5.8.4.3 (July 18, 2017). The taxpayer's ability to pay is referred to as the
taxpayer's reasonable collection potential or "RCP." IRM Exhibit 5.8.1-1.
86. IRM 5.8.4.3.1 (Apr. 30, 2015).
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analysis that provides a potential template that could be applied in the
student loan context.
2. Financial Analysis to Determine Ability to Pay
The IRS provides detailed guidance for determining a taxpayer's ability
to pay in Sections 5.8.5 (the Financial Analysis section of the OIC
provisions) and 5.15 (the Financial Analysis Handbook in the Collection
Process provisions) of the Internal Revenue Manual. A critical aspect of this
process is the taxpayer's self-reporting of financial information, which can
then be subject to IRS verification." Individual taxpayers primarily report
this information on the IRS Form 433-A (OIC).8"
The first information that the taxpayer reports on this form is a detailed
picture of the taxpayer's net assets and income. In regards to assets, the
taxpayer reports the net equity in the following: (1) cash and investments,
including foreign and retirement accounts; (2) real estate; (3) vehicles; and
(4) other valuable assets such as "artwork, collections, jewelry, items of
value in safe deposit boxes, interest in a company or business that is not
publicly traded, etc."8 9 Self-employed taxpayers provide additional
information on the Form 433-A (QIC) regarding the equity that exists in the
taxpayer's business assets and the business's net business income, as well as
a detailed description of income source and income-producing expenses.90
The 433-A (QIC) completes the income picture by requesting information
about the taxpayer's wages, social security, pension, and other income such
as unemployment, interest, dividends, distributions from entities, net rental
income, child support, and alimony.9'
In addition to determining the taxpayer's net assets income, the Form
433-A (QIC) also requests information regarding income from anyone else
in the taxpayer's household (even those who might not be related and those
who are not liable for the tax liability), as well as certain allowable
household expenses that, while not deductible for tax purposes, are
considered in determining the taxpayer's ability to pay in order to ensure
87. IRM 5.8.5.3 (Sept. 30, 2013).
88. Businesses report their information on a similar form, I.R.S. Form 433-B (OIC).
89. I.R.S. Form 433-A (OIC), Section 3. Note that the net equity of certain types of
assets are reduced by certain exemption amounts, such as in the case of cash, which currently
has a $1,000 exemption amount, and automobiles, which currently have a $3,450 exemption
amount per vehicle, with up to two cars being allowed for joint filers. IRM 5.8.5.7, 5.8.5.12
(Sept. 30, 2013).
90. I.R.S. Form 433-A (OIC), Sections 4-6.
91. I.R.S. Form 433-A (OIC), Section 7; IRM 5.15.1.11 (Nov. 17, 2014).
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that payment of the offer amount will not negatively impact the taxpayer's
ability to meet basic living expenses.92 Although the IRS is not permitted to
consider the income and assets of other non-liable household members
(including non-liable spouses in cases in which the liability is not joint
liability) in determining the taxpayer's ability to pay, the IRS is permitted to
request household information regarding income and expenses as part of its
process of determining the percentage of the household expenses to which
the taxpayer contributes.93
In determining how much future income will be considered as part of
what the taxpayer can afford to pay, the taxpayer may claim the following
allowable expenses: (1) food, clothing, and miscellaneous; (2) housing and
utilities; (3) vehicle operating costs; (4) public transportation costs; (5)
health insurance premiums; (6) out-of-pocket healthcare costs; (7) court-
ordered payments; (8) child/dependent care payments; (9) life insurance
premiums; (10) current monthly taxes; (11) secured debts (including
government guaranteed student loans); and (12) delinquent state or local tax
payments or both. 94
Given that this financial analysis considers a large number of taxpayer
financial attributes, which could significantly increase administrative costs if
the IRS had to examine documentation for each taxpayer to prove the
expenses, the IRS has streamlined the analysis by adopting national and
local standards that can be used as a reasonable proxy for many of these
expenses. Taxpayers are permitted to claim the national standards for food,
clothing, and other related personal care items, as well as out-of-pocket
healthcare expenses.95 The amount of these standards varies based on family
size and provides a baseline level of allowable expenses for which no
documentation is required.96 Taxpayers may claim expenses in excess of
these amounts, but documentation must be provided.97 In addition to these
national standards, the IRS has established local standards for housing,
utilities, and transportation.98 These expenses vary by the taxpayer's
geographical location, given that these costs can change considerably from
one locale to another, and the taxpayer is permitted to claim the lesser of the
standard or the amount actually claimed and verified by the taxpayer, unless
92. I.R.S. Form 433-A (OIC), Section 7.
93. IRM 5.8.5.24 (Sept. 30, 2013); IRM 5.15.1.4 (Nov. 17, 2014).
94. I.R.S. Form 433-A (OIC), Section 7.
95. IRM 5.15.1.8 (Nov. 17, 2014).
96. IRM 5.15.1.8(2) (Nov. 17, 2014).
97. IRM 5.15.1.8(3) (Nov. 17, 2014).
98. IRM 5.8.5.22.2 (Oct. 22, 2010); IRM 5.15.1.9 (Nov. 17, 2014).
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the taxpayer is able to demonstrate that a higher expense is necessary.99
Expenses outside the national and local standards are allowed if they are
deemed to be necessary or conditionally justified under the taxpayer's
circumstances, and the IRS has established specific guidance for each type
of expense to determine whether or not it is necessary. 100
The allowable monthly expenses are subtracted from the taxpayer's
monthly income to determine the appropriate future income amount to
consider (usually twelve to twenty-four months of income, depending on
what the repayment period is).' 0' The IRS recognizes that situations arise in
which this figure is not an accurate representation of the taxpayer's future
income because the taxpayer may be likely to experience a significant
increase in income, such as when a student will graduate into a field that will
yield higher income or when a highly trained taxpayer is temporarily
working in a low-paying job while searching for employment in the
taxpayer's field. 102 In these cases, the IRS will often enter into a future
income collateral agreement with the taxpayer as a condition of the IRS's
acceptance of the taxpayer's offer, requiring the taxpayer to pay a higher
amount if this higher income materializes. 103 Effectively, collateral
agreements allow the IRS to provide immediate relief while insuring against
the possibility of providing relief to a taxpayer who does not actually need it
on account of receiving a higher income shortly after the IRS accepted the
offer.
B. Structuring a Student Loan Compromise Program
The most applicable principles from the OIC program that can be
imported to the SLCP are the program's focus on basing relief on a
taxpayer's complete financial picture, which takes into account not only the
taxpayer's current ability to pay, but also future ability to pay, as well as the
OIC program's acknowledgment hat third parties, such as spouses and other
family members, should not have their incomes and assets taken into
99. Id.
100. IRM 5.15.1.10 (Nov. 17, 2014).
101. IRM 5.8.4.3.1 (Apr. 30, 2015).
102. IRM 5.8.6.2.1 (July 31, 2014).
103. IRM 5.8.5.21 (Sept. 30, 2013). Note that the possibility of this future income cannot
be merely speculative, as the IRS will not require a future income collateral agreement in
situations where the IRS is speculating that the taxpayer might win the lottery, come into an
inheritance, or other possible but unlikely events. IRM 5.8.6.2.1(3) (July 31, 2014). The length
of these future income collateral agreements are typically five years. IRM 5.8.6.2.1.1 (July 31,
2014).
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account in determining the taxpayer's ability to pay when they are not liable
for the taxpayer's underlying debt.
The first way these principles could be applied to the SLCP would be to
expand the determination of ability to pay from the current repayment
programs' myopic approach of focusing only on a borrower's adjusted gross
income. This expanded focus would require borrowers to provide
information each year on their reasonable repayment potential, which would
include the four primary elements that constitute reasonable collection
potential under the OIC program: (1) likely future income; (2) net realizable
equity in assets; (3) assets held by third parties on account of intentional
borrower asset dissipation, fraudulent transfers, and similar transactions; and
(4) borrower-owned assets beyond the government's reach, such as assets
located in foreign countries. Importantly, while borrowers might have to
report financial information for certain non-liable parties, as they have to in
the OIC program, this information would not be used in determining the
borrower's ability to pay but would only be used to determine how much the
borrower contributes to household expenses. The reasonable repayment
potential would be capped at the principal amount of the loan plus
capitalized interest, with an interest cap of 10% of the original principal
balance. 104
Once the SLCP determines the reasonable repayment potential, the
borrower's repayment amount could be set at 10% of the reasonable
repayment potential each year until the debt is fully repaid or until, as
described below, the borrower successfully submits a request for partial or
full debt forgiveness.0 This repayment amount would still ensure that
borrowers could fund a basic standard of living before having to repay
104. The 10% principal amount cap on capitalized interest is taken from PAYE and ICR
and seems a sensible balance between preventing borrowers from being so overwhelmed by
capitalized interest that the loan can never be repaid and having a reasonable amount of
interest to account for the extended prepayment period. See supra note 21 and accompanying
text.
105. Admittedly, this 10% could be a different percentage, although 10% is the
percentage used in the new income-based repayment model and, as a result, appears to be a
percentage around which there is at least some consensus. In addition, paying 10% of the
reasonable repayment potential per year harmonizes the ten-year repayment plan (if the
reasonable repayment potential is the full amount of the loan) with the concept of providing
for lower payments for taxpayers who cannot afford payments under the standard repayment
plan. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. But see Susan Dynarski, America Can Fix Its
Student Loan Crisis. Just Ask Australia, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/10/upshot/america-can-fix-its-student-loan-crisis-just-ask-
australia.html (arguing that the standard ten-year repayment plan should be extended out to
twenty-five years or more, as it is in other Western countries, given that repayment should
occur over the life of the asset as it does for other assets with similarly long useful lives).
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anything because basic living expenses would be taken into account in
determining the reasonable repayment potential. There would be no set
number of years after which the debt would be forgiven completely,
although borrowers could submit a request for full or partial forgiveness at
any time, just as taxpayers do not need to wait a prescribed period of time
before submitting an QIC for an assessed tax liability.1 06 The loans would be
forgiven completely if the reasonable repayment potential, combined with an
examination of the likelihood of the borrower's income or assets increasing
significantly in the future, suggested that the borrower would never be able
to repay the loan.'07 Were loan forgiveness to occur under the SLCP, it
would be tax-free regardless of whether the borrower had been employed in
the public or private sectors. 108
To illustrate how such an SLCP would work, consider Delisle and
Holt's example of Robert, discussed in Section III.A.' 09 In that example,
Robert received significant loan forgiveness after paying only a small
portion of his outstanding student debt, despite being able to accumulate
significant assets. Under the SLCP, Robert would still receive the benefits of
manageable monthly payments early in his career in which he needs his
payments to be lower, given that he has minimal assets and a more modest
income when compared to the size of his outstanding debt." 0 Under the
SLCP, he would still receive the benefits of not having to include his
spouse's income or assets in the determination of his ability to repay the
loan, but he would be able to achieve this benefit without him or his spouse
having to file separate tax returns that would require them to give up other
valuable tax benefits. However, under the SLCP, he would likely not have
his loan forgiven on account of the fact that, given the progression of his
106. While taxpayers do not have to wait a prescribed period of time after a tax has been
assessed before submitting an OIC, the taxpayers do have to bring themselves into current
filing compliance before submitting an offer, and taxpayers cannot submit an offer for a
liability that has become unenforceable. IRM 5.8.1.13 (May 5, 2017); IRM 5.8.1.9.2(1) (Feb.
26, 2013).
107. While in many instances it might be clear that a borrower would not be able to repay
the loan given factors such as the borrower's health, age, and employment history, in other
situations where repayment potential might be uncertain, the government could also partially
or fully forgive the debt tied to a future net worth collateral agreement to protect against the
risk of forgiving the loan only to see the borrower receive significant assets or a future income
stream that would allow for a larger amount to be paid.
108. Tax-free debt forgiveness would also be consistent with the tax treatment of
liabilities forgiven through the OIC program. COD Income, supra note 84, at 315-19.
109. Delisle & Holt, supra note 34.
110. The specific amount of Robert's payment would depend on what his allowable
expenses were or, if national standards for allowable expenses were used, on the values
established for the national standards.
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income increases as well as asset accumulation, he could reasonably be
expected to pay off the loan eventually without such payoff being financially
crippling. Of course, were Robert's financial circumstances to decline
significantly in the future, rather than improve as the hypothetical
contemplates, he could still request tax-free partial or full loan forgiveness
under the SLCP if he could demonstrate that he would not be likely to be
able to repay the loan in the future.
C. Benefits of the Student Loan Compromise Program
Implementing the SLCP offers advantages over current student loan
repayment programs in that the SLCP more accurately determines a
borrower's actual ability to pay; will make students and institutions of higher
education more price sensitive; minimizes the inefficient preference being
provided towards work in the nonprofit sector; reduces the disadvantages
currently experienced by some married couples under the current repayment
system; and reduces planning opportunities that produce unwarranted
windfalls to borrowers.
1. The SLCP Better Reflects Borrower Ability to Pay
The SLCP provides a better mechanism for determining a borrower's
ability to pay than the current system that relies exclusively on taxable
income. The SLCP allows the government "to better account for big-picture,
balance-sheet inequities" between borrowers, which results in a much more
accurate determination of when it is appropriate to provide debt relief than
the current system that ties relief to the determination of taxable income."
While some ability-to-pay considerations are considered under the current
repayment programs, given the potential use of the bankruptcy system as
well as the Section 108 cancellation of indebtedness exclusion, the SLCP
would be a more predictable and flexible vehicle for factoring in ability to
pay.
The SLCP would be more predictable than the current bankruptcy
standard which, regardless of the loan's age, will only permit discharge of
student loans in the case of "undue hardship," a term which has not been
clearly defined, leading to different outcomes that often simply depend on
the judge applying the standard."2 Furthermore, creditors' ability to
challenge necessary expenses in bankruptcy litigation has resulted in
111. Getting More by Asking Less, supra note 77, at 1092.
112. Simkovic, supra note 2, at 613.
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inconsistent decisions regarding what expenses are allowable, exacerbating
this unpredictability. "13
In addition, the SLCP, through its potential use of collateral agreements
similar to those found in the OIC program, provides potentially more
flexibility than either the bankruptcy courts or IRC Section 108 cancellation-
of-debt income principles to tailor relief to both an individual borrower's
present and future financial circumstances."4 IRC Section 108 is a poor tool
for providing student loan relief because its logic of deferring, rather than
completely forgiving, tax for forgiven student loans outside the PSLF
program is more appropriate for relief from debts related to acquiring either
tangible or intangible assets that are more easily valued than education and,
accordingly, can often be liquidated to help satisfy a tax liability resulting
from their discharge."' Extending PSLF's complete tax forgiveness to all
student loans through an amendment to Section 108 is also problematic
because of the potential for too many borrowers to experience a windfall
when they could afford to repay more of the loan.116
While focusing on a borrower's complete financial picture would retain
the tax-like characteristics already present in the current student loan
repayment system, this expanded focus would function more as a wealth tax
than an income tax. Modeling student loan repayment around wealth tax
principles, rather than solely modeling repayment around an income tax, is
preferable because the arguments favoring wealth taxes have more force in
the student loan context, in which borrowers' ability to pay for the
educational benefits they have received through student loans is better
represented by their wealth rather than by their income. While both an
income tax and a wealth tax are justified in part by the fact that they reflect a
taxpayer's ability to pay, a wealth tax approximates ability to pay better than
an income tax because it taxes potential income from capital without
requiring a realization event. " Because liabilities for student loans retain
113. Redleman & Weingart, supra note 21, at 278-82.
114. For this flexibility to be realized, however, the conditions under which collateral
agreements are utilized would likely have to be broadened and liberalized from the IRS's
current practice of only using them in a limited range of circumstances. Joseph C. Dugan,
Compromising Compliance? The IRS Offer in Compromise Program and Opportunities for
Reform, 26 TAX LAW. (forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2725480.
115. LaPlante, supra note 41, at 712-14; Tax Bomb, supra note 24, at 189. This tax
deferral can also have the effect of incentivizing bankruptcy filings rather than encouraging
more flexible workouts of the debt. Zacks, supra note 10, at 333-38.
116. See supra Part III.
117. David Shakow & Reed Suldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV.
499, 501 (2000). Taxing potential income is harder to justify in the context of an income tax
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loan-like characteristics in addition to their tax-like characteristics, there is
less justification for permitting borrowers the flexibility to dispose of capital
when they find it optimal to do so by only taxing capital when there is a
realization event. If borrowers have sufficient wealth to repay funds they
chose to borrow, those borrowers should be expected to apply that capital
towards repayment.
2. The SLCP Will Cause Students to Become More Price Sensitive
and Will Put Market Pressures on Higher Education
Institutions
The SLCP would not completely solve the problem of higher education
institutions being insulated from market pressure. It would, however, still
mitigate this problem by causing a larger number of borrowers to become
more price sensitive to educational costs. Borrowers under the current
income-based repayment programs primarily lack price sensitivity because
they are assured of debt forgiveness after a fixed period of time, provided
that their incomes do not become high enough to pay the debt during that
time period." Such a system does not eliminate borrower price sensitivity
completely. Nevertheless, it does not make borrowers nearly as cost-
conscious as they would be if repayment was tied to their overall wealth and
if loan forgiveness was not assured after a fixed number of years, but rather
would only occur if and when the borrower could demonstrate that he or she
would likely never be able to repay the loan.
3. The SLCP Removes the Inefficient Preference Provided to
Government and Nonprofit Work
By tying loan forgiveness to a borrower's ability to pay and by making
such loan forgiveness tax-free without regard to the taxpayer's type of
employment, the SLCP would limit itself to a goal of providing relief based
on financial considerations without trying to also incorporate additional
policy goals. This singular focus would allow government incentives for
public service to be accomplished through more direct and efficient means,
because of concerns about administrative costs and because of fundamental views regarding
allowing individuals the freedom to choose professions that might not be as lucrative as others.
Id. In the context of a wealth tax, however, these arguments do not have as much force. Id. ("If
two people earn $20,000 per year in salary, but one has $100,000 stuffed in a mattress, it does
not seem unreasonable to say that the one with the cash in the mattress has a greater ability to
pay a tax than the other.").
118. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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such as higher wages designed to incentivize the entire population rather
than just those with student loans.119 Such an approach would allow the
government to incentivize public service in a more direct and predictable
manner, while allowing the government's student loan relief efforts to
benefit from being more narrowly focused on the singular goal of providing
relief to those who truly need it as opposed to the combined policy goals of
promoting public service and providing student debt relief.'20
4. The SLCP Would Reduce Disadvantages Currently Faced by
Some Married Couples
Using the SLCP would significantly reduce the disadvantages that some
married couples currently experience under the current income-based
student repayment programs. Although many aspects of the Internal
Revenue Code provide incentives to treat married taxpayers as a single
economic unit based on presumed economies of scale in marriage, the wide
disparity in living arrangements in the United States makes treating married
taxpayers as two separate economic units-at least to the extent that it is
administratively practicable-a more applicable analytical framework.121
119. Simkovic, supra note 2, at 593; see Sheffrin, supra note 14, at 1193. Exacerbating
this problem is the fact that some borrowers have selected employment positions to take
advantage of PSLF, only to have the government retroactively change its determination that
the borrowers were employed in a qualifying position. Lieber, supra note 47.
120. See Sheffrin, supra note 14, at 1193.
121. Compare Grossman & Canton, supra note 50 (arguing for treating married couples
as an economic unit), and McMahon, supra note 59, at 746 (arguing that married couples
should be viewed as an economic unit because they are the best proxy for determining a
married spouse's ability to pay a tax liability), with Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation
and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1389, 1419-23 (1975) (observing that economies of scale
perhaps should not be a factor considered in allocating the tax burden because tax law cannot
do so consistently and because economies of scale routinely exist outside of marital
relationships in that they can extend both to other familial and non-familial relationships), and
Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens,
59 TEX. L. REv. 1, 29 (1980) (recognizing the variety of living arrangements that make
treating all married couples as an economic unit unworkable), and Lily Kahng, One is the
Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 660-
62 (2010) (arguing that treating married couples as an economic unit based on principles of
horizontal equity ignores other societal differences among taxpayers and attempts to impose a
tax based on a fiction of couples equality that does not exist), and Marjorie Kornhauser, Love,
Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 63, 80-86 (1993) (summarizing empirical research demonstrating that there is wide
variety among couples in regards to their attitudes towards pooling their economic resources),
and James Maule, Tax and Marriage: Unhitching the Horse and the Carriage, 67 TAX NOTES
539, 550-51 (arguing in favor of eliminating the marriage penalty and for reforming the Code
as much as possible "to reflect the special and central significance of the individual in
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Even for couples who do share resources and merge their finances through
mechanisms such as joint accounts, data describing these couples' financial
practices indicates that actual control over the couple's money primarily
resides with the earner. 122 The current joint filing system already has
unfairness built into it by incentivizing the joint filing status, which does not
allocate a married couple's tax burden based on each spouse's ability to pay
and does not result in neutrality between married and unmarried
individuals.123 Some inequitable treatment of married individuals might be
justifiable and necessary given the fact that it is impossible to achieve
complete marriage neutrality in the tax code without sacrificing one of the
two desirable goals of imposing equal taxes on equal income married
couples and maintaining a progressive rate structure. 124 Nevertheless, these
inequities should not be exacerbated by compounding the differential
treatment of married couples through the quasi-tax/quasi-loan regime of the
student loan repayment programs that currently force taxpayers to file
separately in order to be treated as a separate economic unit for purposes of
the student loan repayment calculation. This incentive arguably has a
positive effect of causing more taxpayers to elect out of the joint filing
status, thus reducing the number of couples who experience the distortions
caused by joint filing. However, taxpayers are still required to give up other
society"), and Shari Motro, A New "I Do": Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91
IOWA L. REV. 1509, 1513-15 (2006) (observing that it would be more logical to treat
taxpayers united economically, regardless of marital status, as one economic unit as opposed
to forcing an economic unity upon married couples that may not exist while ignoring others
who are in fact united economically), and Zelenak, supra note 53, at 817 (arguing that the
arbitrariness of marriage penalties and bonuses at different income levels makes a compelling
argument for abandoning the goal of imposing equal tax on equal income married couples that
is realized through joint filing).
122. Christian, supra note 57, at 321; Kornhauser, supra note 121, at 90; see also
Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 356-57 (1994)
(noting that the tax system should allocate liability based on ability to pay, which is better
determined by who controls income rather than who consumes it, and which is thus better
supported by treating spouses as separate economic units).
123. Cicconi, supra note 57, at 282-83.
124. Bittker, supra note 121, at 1396; see Yair Listokin, Taxation and Marriage: A
Reappraisal, 67 TAX L. REV. 185 (2014) (arguing that policy makers should try to balance all
three of these policy goals by pursuing policies that minimize deviations towards one of the
three policies at the expense of one of the other two). In addition, some inequitable treatment
between married couples and single taxpayers could be justified on the grounds of remedying
some of the disadvantages faced by women in the workplace. See Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy
and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001 (1996)
(arguing that removing the joint filing requirement can only be justified on feminism grounds
from the perspective of equality of treatment, but that other feminist tax policy goals would be
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tax benefits to achieve this status, which minimizes the positive effects of a
reduction in couples filing joint returns. 125 Because these student loan
repayment programs have tax-like effects but are not a complete tax, it is
more justifiable to make these programs more marriage neutral than other
aspects of the income tax, given that the student loan repayment programs
do not have to be as concerned about maintaining progressivity in rates and
treating equal income married couples similarly. Rather, under the SLCP,
student loan repayment programs can achieve progressivity through
selective debt forgiveness for those who need it, rather than through tax
rates, and do not need to be as concerned with imposing a tax burden equally
across married couples because these programs are addressing repayment of
a liability that individual taxpayers incurred (and a benefit they received in
the form of education) on their own.
5. The SLCP Reduces Gaming Opportunities
Under current income-based student loan repayment plans, the OIC
program could still be used to reduce the eventual tax liability when the
cancellation of debt income is incurred, which could allow ability-to-pay
principles, similar to those that would be used in the SLCP, to be taken into
account.126 The significant amount of time in which taxpayers can plan for
this eventual discharge (and structure their assets accordingly), prevents this
mechanism from serving as a suitable one for tying repayment to a
borrower's ability to repay the loan at any point after incurring the debt.127
The SLCP addresses this problem by incorporating these principles much
earlier and much more consistently throughout the life cycle of loan
repayment. Accordingly, borrowers would find it more difficult to structure
their assets in a manner designed to make them appear artificially destitute at
the end of the loan in order to avoid a significant portion of their repayment
obligation.
D. Response to Potential Disadvantages
The SLCP does have some potential disadvantages compared with the
current student loan repayment system, although these potential drawbacks
can be successfully mitigated and do not outweigh the potential benefits.
125. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
126. See Sheffrin, supra note 14, at 1195 (noting that aspects of the offer in compromise
procedure could be used to reduce the COD income as needed in the context of student loan
repayment).
127. See supra Section III.E.
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The first potential disadvantage is based on the wealth tax-like qualities of
the SLCP. Wealth taxes can be legitimately criticized in that they unfairly
allocate a larger burden of funding public expenditures to savers rather than
spenders. 128 This critique has less force in the context of student loan
repayment, in which the recipient has received the public benefit personally
(in the form of education) rather than simply in the same manner as the
public at large (such as infrastructure). The fact that a saver has an increased
repayment obligation is justifiable given that the saver has incurred a debt
that, absent the SLCP, would have to be repaid in full from savings. In
addition, under the SLCP, while spenders may have less assets than savers,
the fact that repayment is tied not only to income and wealth, but also
includes improperly dissipated assets in determining repayment ability,
prevents spenders from receiving an undue advantage under the program.
In addition, a wealth tax modeled approach invites potential problems
with valuation that can raise administrative and litigation costs to an
impractical level, given that valuation would likely have to be assessed on an
annual basis.129 These costs, however, are potentially mitigated by the fact
that a wealth tax modeled approach would bring into the tax base certain
assets that generate imputed income and are not accordingly a part of the
repayment calculation under a purely income tax modeled approach.3 0
Although some aspects of wealth, such as leisure and psychological rewards
not associated with wealth, could still not be taken into account under a
wealth tax model (as there is no feasible mechanism to do so), a wealth tax
approach would still do a superior job than the current income tax based
approach of taking more financial sources into account in determining a
borrower's ability to repay for a public benefit.'3 '
While the SLCP does eliminate current planning opportunities designed
to minimize income and plan for eventual tax-free or tax deferred debt
discharge, its focus on taxpayer wealth would raise the possibility of
increased planning opportunities to minimize the wealth tax base, as
taxpayers/borrowers would inevitably adopt some of the more common
estate planning techniques to reduce the value of their assets that serve as the
128. Rakowski, supra note 32, at 365-66.
129. James R. Repetti, Commentary, It's All About Valuation, 53 TAX L. REV. 607, 609-
12 (2000).
130. Michael S. Knoll, Commentary of Fruit and Trees: The Relationship Between
Income and Wealth Taxes, 53 TAx L. REV. 587, 590-93 (2000).
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basis for their ability to repay student loans.3 2 The costs associated with
employing these planning techniques, however, would mitigate against their
overuse because, by the time a borrower had enough assets to make
incurring these costs a sensible decision, that borrower would likely have
crossed the threshold into being able to repay the loan in full. In addition,
given that ability to pay would be determined on a year-to-year basis under
the SLCP, amounts spent to form entities designed to lower asset value
could be treated as dissipated assets that would be included in determining
the borrower's ability to pay.
Another potential disadvantage to the SLCP is that, because the SLCP
would make it easier to provide relief than the bankruptcy system, the
government might resist adoption of the SLCP given the fact that adoption
would make it more difficult for the government to collect on outstanding
loans.'33 Further contributing to potential government resistance would be
the fact that this approach would potentially increase administrative costs,
because it inherently presents a less uniform approach to administration than
the current system of student loan repayment programs.3 4 The government
would either have to bear these costs directly in the form of increased hiring
or indirectly in the form of paying private loan servicers higher fees to
engage in the more complex loan processing under the SLCP; these costs
would likely be transferred to other borrowers in the form of higher interest
rates.35 Furthermore, the government would likely be concerned that it (and,
in tum, either the public at large or other borrowers who would be charged
higher interest rates) would incur these costs only to see the borrower's other
132. Repetti, supra note 129, at 612 (noting that these techniques could include the use of
family limited partnerships, family limited liability companies, as well as other split ownership
devices and valuation discounts).
133. See Getting More by Asking Less, supra note 77, at 1098-99 (noting that the ability
to collect on claims in bankruptcy will naturally be part of the government's calculation in
determining whether to implement a program that compromises tax liability).
134. Simkovic, supra note 2, at 619.
135. These costs likely would be similar to the costs of administering the current OIC
program, given that the IRS receives approximately 60,000 to 70,000 OIC requests each year
and has just under three million people in currently not collectible (CNC) status, which
requires a similar financial analysis performed on a Form 433-F. See NAT'L TAXPAYER
ADVOCACY SERV., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 208 (2014); I.R.S. Form 433-F. These
figures are similar to the almost two million student loan borrowers enrolled in IBR or PAYE
as of 2014. Jason Delisle, Number of Borrowers Using Income-Based Repayment Doubles in
One Year, NEW AM. (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.newamerica.org/education-
policy/edcentral/borrowers-using-income-based-repayment-double-one-year/.
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creditors capture the benefits. 136 These costs could be justified, however, if
conceptualized as a form of social insurance in which the public pays higher
costs as a premium for insurance against student loan default.3 7 In addition,
these costs would be offset to a degree by the potential for increased revenue
derived from curtailing debt forgiveness only to those taxpayers who cannot
afford to pay their loans.38 In addition, potential revenue losses to the
government become less dramatic if this loan repayment approach is able to
provide more relief (through tax-free debt forgiveness) to the most deserving
borrowers, who would then not have to rely on an increased government
social safety net. 139
V. CONCLUSION
When considering how to best provide student loan relief to borrowers
struggling to manage payments, Congress understandably defaulted to
basing such relief on a taxpayer's income, given that a taxpayer's
responsibility to pay for many government benefits is a function of the
taxpayer's income that serves as the basis for federal taxation. In adopting an
income-based approach, however, Congress did not anticipate the fact hat
tying loan relief to income would not accurately measure a borrower's
ability to pay the loan; distort the market for higher education; inefficiently
incentivize public service; disadvantage many married couples due to the
nature of joint filing; and create opportunities for creative tax planning and
asset protection that would create windfalls to certain borrowers.
136. Shu-Yi Oei, Who Wins When Uncle Sam Loses? Social Insurance and the
Forgiveness of Tax Debts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421, 449-52 (2012) [hereinafter Who Wins
When Uncle Sam Loses].
137. Id. at 461-86. Under a social insurance justification, resolving the debt to the
government before bankruptcy could be advantageous because the government is better able to
bear the default risk, and early resolution of the government debt could help borrowers avoid
financially disastrous consequences. Id. at 482-85. However, there could be negative impacts
as well in the form of increased risky lending by other creditors and impacts on credit pricing.
Id.
138. See Getting More by Asking Less, supra note 77, at 1084-85 (noting that the offer in
compromise program has generated higher rates of collection on existing debts than other
collection mechanisms). Determining whether, and to what extent, these benefits would
mitigate the costs is highly complicated given how many potential variables are involved and,
"[a]s a result, while policy makers have put forth discrete justifications for and against non-
collection [of taxes], an overarching and theoretically consistent approach to non-collection
that weighs all possible considerations has not yet been formulated." Who Wins Wen Uncle
Sam Loses, supra note 136, at 448.
139. Getting More by Asking Less, supra note 77, at 1097.
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While these distortions cannot be eliminated completely, they can be
minimized by basing student loan relief on a borrower's overall ability to
repay the loan as opposed to borrower income. The IRS has provided a
roadmap for how to do this effectively through its OIC program. This
program can be adapted to the student loan context through the creation of
an SLCP program. Such a program might have certain drawbacks in regards
to administration costs, but it would likely have benefits that outweigh such
costs by bringing in more revenue in the form of repaid loans while limiting
relief to those borrowers who need it the most.
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